Nishant Yadav
D.A.V. (P.G.) College, Bulandshahr
Abstract
The proposal of One Nation, One Election (ONOE) in India aims to synchronize elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies in a bid to enhance governance efficiency, reduce financial burdens, and minimize frequent electoral disruptions. While the idea promises several logistical and administrative advantages, it also raises significant constitutional, political, and federal concerns. This paper critically examines the ONOE proposal through a multidisciplinary lens-drawing on constitutional analysis, comparative international experiences, and democratic theory. It explores the historical context of electoral cycles in India, the practical and normative challenges to implementation, and the implications for federalism, voter behaviour, and political accountability. Case studies from countries such as the United States, South Africa, and Sweden are analyzed to assess the feasibility of electoral synchronization in federal and quasi-federal systems. The paper argues that while ONOE holds potential, its realization must be guided by constitutional safeguards, federal consensus, and phased reforms to avoid undermining democratic diversity and institutional integrity.
Keywords: One Nation One Election, federalism, democratic synchronization, electoral reform, constitutional amendment, political accountability, India
1. Introduction
Democracy, by its very essence, requires periodic elections to ensure political accountability, representational legitimacy, and participatory governance. India, the world’s largest democracy, conducts elections at multiple tiers-from the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and State Legislative Assemblies to Urban Local Bodies and Panchayati Raj Institutions. While this electoral vibrancy reflects a robust democratic spirit, it also brings with it significant financial, administrative, and political costs. Against this backdrop, the idea of “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE)-a synchronized electoral system where elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies are held simultaneously-has gained traction in recent years as a proposed electoral reform.
The ONOE proposal is not entirely new. India held simultaneous elections in the initial decades following Independence-specifically in 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967. However, this synchrony was disrupted due to premature dissolutions of various state assemblies and the Lok Sabha beginning in the late 1960s (Election Commission of India, 2016). Since then, elections have followed an increasingly staggered and asynchronous cycle, often resulting in a situation where one part of the country is perpetually in “election mode.” This has prompted concerns about policy paralysis due to the frequent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), excessive financial burdens on the public exchequer, and constant political mobilization that affects governance (Law Commission of India, 1999).
The idea of reverting to a synchronized electoral calendar has been repeatedly proposed in policy circles. The 170th Report of the “Law Commission of India” (1999) recommended simultaneous elections to enhance political stability and administrative efficiency. More recently, the NITI Aayog’s Discussion Paper (2018) and the Election Commission of India’s feasibility assessments have revived public debate. In 2023, the Government of India constituted a high-level committee under former President Ram Nath Kovind to examine the legal and logistical framework required for implementing ONOE, highlighting its renewed significance in national discourse (Press Information Bureau, 2023).
Despite these developments, the ONOE proposal has sparked intense debate. Proponents argue that it will streamline governance, reduce election-related expenditures, and minimize disruptions caused by frequent elections (Dubey, 2018; NITI Aayog, 2018). Opponents, however, caution that such a move may undermine the federal structure of the Constitution, reduce the accountability of state governments, and homogenize India’s complex and pluralistic electoral landscape (Palshikar, 2023; Mustafa, 2023).
This paper aims to critically examine the feasibility, constitutional implications, democratic consequences, and comparative perspectives on the “One Nation, One Election” proposal. By interrogating both its normative justifications and practical challenges, the study seeks to contribute meaningfully to the ongoing debate around electoral reforms in India. It draws on theories of federalism, deliberative democracy, and public choice, while also analyzing case studies from other democracies that have attempted electoral synchronization. Ultimately, the paper poses a fundamental question: Can democratic synchronization enhance democratic deepening, or does it risk weakening the very diversity that makes Indian democracy resilient?
2. Historical Evolution and Policy Context
The concept of simultaneous elections in India has a significant historical precedent. Following independence, elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies were held concurrently in the years 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967. This synchronization occurred organically, as the electoral cycles of both tiers of government were aligned. However, the stability of these cycles began to unravel in the late 1960s and early 1970s when several State Assemblies and the Lok Sabha were dissolved prematurely due to political instability, defections, and the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356 of the Constitution (Election Commission of India, 2016). As a result, the electoral calendar became staggered, with different states going to polls at different times, thereby ending the era of simultaneous elections.
The fragmentation of the electoral schedule posed several governance and financial challenges. The frequent imposition of the “Model Code of Conduct (MCC)” before every election restricted policy decisions and developmental activities, leading to administrative inertia. Simultaneously, the financial burden of conducting elections in such a vast and populous country became increasingly significant. These practical difficulties sparked interest among policymakers and scholars in exploring the possibility of reviving simultaneous elections.
The first major institutional proposal came in 1999, when the Law Commission Report, emphasized the benefits of holding simultaneous elections. The report observed that staggered elections had contributed to disruptions in governance and massive election-related expenditures. It proposed synchronizing electoral cycles in two phases over time, while also suggesting constitutional amendments to prevent premature dissolution of assemblies (Law Commission of India, 1999).
In 2015, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice reiterated this suggestion in its 79th Report, advocating for simultaneous elections and calling for a political consensus on the issue (Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2015). Following this, the Election Commission of India (ECI) expressed conditional support, noting that simultaneous elections were feasible if the necessary constitutional and legal amendments were made, and if logistical challenges (like availability of EVMs and security personnel) were addressed (Election Commission of India, 2016).
Further momentum was provided by the NITI Aayog through its 2018 Discussion Paper titled Simultaneous Elections: Saving Costs and Improving Governance. The paper outlined potential models for implementation and emphasized the need for enhanced policy continuity, administrative efficiency, and reduced campaign expenditure (NITI Aayog, 2018). Importantly, it also recognized that achieving this reform would require extensive amendments to Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and 356 of the Indian Constitution, among others.
In 2023, the Government of India constituted a High-Level Committee under the chairmanship of former President Ram Nath Kovind to study the feasibility of ONOE. The committee was mandated to examine the legal, administrative, and logistical requirements for implementing simultaneous elections and to engage with various stakeholders including political parties, the Election Commission, and legal experts (Press Information Bureau, 2023).
Despite these repeated initiatives, achieving synchronization remains a complex task. While its theoretical merits continue to be discussed, the practical challenges-such as the requirement for constitutional amendments, political consensus, and safeguarding federal principles-have yet to be fully addressed.
3. Theoretical Framework
To critically analyze the “One Nation, One Election (ONOE)” proposal, it is essential to anchor the discussion in relevant political and administrative theories. The interplay between electoral reforms and democratic governance in a federal setup demands a multidimensional theoretical lens. This section draws upon four key frameworks: Federalism Theory, Deliberative Democracy, Public Choice Theory, and Electoral Systems Theory.
3.1 Federalism Theory
Federalism is central to the Indian political system. Rooted in the idea of shared sovereignty, federalism ensures that power is constitutionally divided between the Centre and the States. The ONOE proposal potentially disrupts this balance by centralizing the electoral process. According to Wheare (1963), a federal system thrives on the autonomy of constituent units; any attempt to homogenize political processes may reduce the functional independence of states. Critics argue that synchronized elections risk submerging regional voices under national narratives, thereby weakening the democratic fabric of Indian federalism (Palshikar, 2023).
Moreover, constitutional scholars warn that uniform electoral cycles could allow a dominant national party to influence state-level outcomes through national-level issues, eroding the political diversity that federal systems are meant to preserve (Mustafa, 2023). Hence, federalism theory urges caution in pursuing reforms that may dilute sub-national autonomy.
3.2 Deliberative Democracy
The theory of deliberative democracy, popularized by Jurgen Habermas (1996), emphasizes the importance of inclusive public discourse and reasoned debate in democratic decision-making. Applying this framework, any move toward ONOE must be deliberative-emerging from democratic consensus rather than executive fiat. Broad-based consultations involving political parties, civil society, state governments, and constitutional bodies like the Election Commission are essential for legitimacy and public acceptance (Dubey, 2018).
If implemented without inclusive deliberation, ONOE risks appearing as a top-down imposition, potentially undermining the participatory spirit of Indian democracy. Deliberative theory therefore supports procedural rigor, legal transparency, and sustained public engagement in the reform process.
3.3 Public Choice Theory
Public Choice Theory views political decision-making as driven by self-interest, particularly of elected officials and bureaucracies (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). This lens can help explain both the advocacy and resistance to ONOE. Advocates argue that frequent elections incentivize short-term populist measures rather than long-term policy planning. Synchronized elections, they claim, can encourage more stable and long-term governance by reducing the need for continuous campaign-mode politics (NITI Aayog, 2018).
However, critics using the same theory warn that ONOE might be used to entrench power by dominant parties under the guise of efficiency. If voters are made to cast ballots for state and national governments simultaneously, central-level charisma could eclipse local accountability, thereby skewing democratic outcomes (Palshikar, 2023).
3.4 Electoral Systems Theory
Electoral Systems Theory studies how electoral rules shape political behavior, party systems, and voter preferences (Norris, 2004). In India’s multiparty system, staggered elections allow regional parties to flourish and voters to differentiate between national and state issues. ONOE could blur these distinctions, leading to what scholars call the “coattail effect,” where voters choose the same party at both levels due to national-level influence (Yadav, 1999).
This undermines voter autonomy and weakens the accountability of regional governments. Therefore, from an electoral systems perspective, synchronized elections may reduce the diversity and representativeness of India’s electoral outcomes.
4. Arguments in Favour of One Nation, One Election (ONOE)
The idea of synchronizing Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections has gained renewed attention due to its potential benefits for governance, fiscal efficiency, and democratic engagement. Proponents of “One Nation, One Election (ONOE)” advance several arguments in its favour, ranging from cost-saving and administrative streamlining to enhanced political stability and voter participation.
4.1 Reduction in Electoral Expenditure
One of the most compelling arguments in favour of ONOE is the enormous cost of conducting frequent elections. Elections in India are resource-intensive, involving the deployment of millions of polling staff, security forces, “electronic voting machines” (EVMs), and logistical infrastructure. According to the Election Commission of India (2016), the cost of the 2014 Lok Sabha election alone was approximately ?3,870 crore. Recurrent elections multiply these expenses, straining both the exchequer and administrative machinery.
The NITI Aayog (2018) estimates that synchronized elections would significantly reduce these recurring costs by consolidating administrative and logistical operations. Political parties too spend considerable amounts on campaigning; hence, simultaneous elections could alleviate the rising costs of political competition.
4.2 Minimization of Model Code of Conduct Disruptions
Another major rationale is the frequent imposition of the “Model Code of Conduct (MCC)”, which restricts governments from announcing new policies or development projects during the election period. When elections are staggered across states throughout the year, the MCC is invoked repeatedly, effectively placing governance in a state of paralysis (Law Commission of India, 1999). Simultaneous elections would limit the duration and frequency of MCC restrictions, thereby enhancing administrative continuity and governance effectiveness.
4.3 Improved Governance and Policy Continuity
Frequent elections compel governments to remain in a perpetual campaign mode, diverting attention from governance to political strategy. ONOE is posited to restore focus on long-term policymaking and governance. The Standing Committee on Law and Justice (2015) suggested that synchronized elections would help elected representatives focus on public service instead of being occupied with electoral strategies and populist measures aimed at short-term electoral gains.
Moreover, scholars argue that a single national mandate would bring greater political stability, especially if governments at the Centre and State assume office at the same time and can plan together over a five-year period (Dubey, 2018).
4.4 Enhanced Voter Turnout and Awareness
Supporters of ONOE also claim that it can boost voter turnout and participation. Multiple elections can lead to voter fatigue and low turnout, especially when elections are held frequently in different states. Synchronizing elections would mean mobilizing the electorate once every five years, thereby focusing voter engagement efforts more efficiently and potentially increasing turnout (Yadav, 1999). A consolidated electoral process also simplifies the dissemination of voter education materials and campaigns by the Election Commission.
4.5 Administrative and Logistical Efficiency
The Election Commission of India and security agencies face a logistical challenge every time elections are conducted in India. A synchronized cycle would help streamline manpower deployment, EVM usage, voter roll management, and training of polling officials. While the initial scale of simultaneous elections would be massive, the long-term benefit lies in reducing duplication of effort and institutional burden (Election Commission of India, 2016).
5. Criticisms and Challenges of One Nation, One Election (ONOE)
While the idea of synchronizing national and state elections may appear administratively efficient and economically viable, it raises several constitutional, political, logistical, and democratic concerns. Critics caution that ONOE, if implemented without adequate safeguards, could undermine India’s federal structure, weaken regional representation, and compromise electoral fairness.
5.1 Constitutional and Legal Constraints
The foremost obstacle to implementing ONOE is the need for extensive constitutional amendments. Articles 83(2) and 172(1) of the Constitution specify fixed terms for the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, respectively. To align their election schedules, either one or more terms must be shortened or extended-actions that require constitutional amendments and the consent of at least half the states, as per Article 368 (Law Commission of India, 1999).
Legal scholars argue that any move to simultaneously dissolve or extend elected governments would violate the basic structure doctrine, which emphasizes democracy and federalism as inviolable principles (Mustafa, 2023). Furthermore, the use of Article 356 to impose President’s Rule and reset timelines for synchronization could invite misuse and authoritarian overreach.
5.2 Undermining Federalism and Regional Representation
ONOE may dilute India’s pluralistic democracy by overshadowing regional concerns with national-level narratives. Simultaneous elections could lead to a situation where national issues dominate campaign discourse, leaving local and regional problems underrepresented (Palshikar, 2023). Regional parties, which often articulate subnational aspirations, may find themselves at a disadvantage when competing alongside better-resourced national parties during a synchronized election cycle.
Federalism theorists such as Wheare (1963) emphasize the importance of preserving state autonomy and independent political agency, which could be jeopardized under a centralized electoral schedule. States governed by opposition parties may perceive the ONOE framework as a tool for political homogenization.
5.3 Logistical and Operational Challenges
Although simultaneous elections promise efficiency, the scale of implementation is unprecedented. Conducting Lok Sabha and all State Assembly elections together would require double the number of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs), polling personnel, and security forces (Election Commission of India, 2016). Current infrastructure is not adequately equipped to handle such a colossal exercise. Moreover, elections are often deferred in regions affected by natural calamities, political instability, or law-and-order situations. Managing such exceptions while preserving synchronization may prove practically unfeasible.
5.4 Risk of the Coattail Effect and Voter Autonomy Loss
Empirical research suggests that simultaneous elections lead to the “coattail effect”, where voters are more likely to vote for the same party at both national and state levels due to the dominance of national campaigns or leaders (Yadav, 1999). This diminishes voter autonomy by discouraging differentiated voting-a hallmark of mature democracies where citizens choose different parties based on local versus national performance.
ONOE could thus result in homogenized political mandates that fail to reflect the diversity of regional opinion, weakening the democratic function of elections as a platform for policy pluralism and representation.
5.5 Political Opposition and Lack of Consensus
Implementation of ONOE requires bipartisan and federal consensus, which remains elusive. Many regional and opposition parties view the proposal as an attempt by the central government to centralize power and marginalize state-level dissent (Dubey, 2018). In a politically fragmented and multi-party system like India, the absence of consensus makes ONOE vulnerable to legal and political contestation.
Without broad-based support, the proposal risks becoming a top-down electoral reform lacking democratic legitimacy, thereby undermining its intended benefits.
6. Comparative Perspectives on Simultaneous Elections
Globally, several democracies conduct simultaneous elections at multiple tiers of government. However, their institutional contexts, electoral systems, and governance models vary significantly from India’s, influencing how such synchronization functions in practice. Comparative analysis offers both supportive and cautionary insights into the feasibility of implementing the “One Nation, One Election (ONOE)” model in India.
6.1 United States: Structured Federal Synchronization
In the United States, federal elections are held every two years on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, with Presidential elections every four years and Congressional elections every two years. While national synchronization exists to a degree, state and local elections are often held on different dates, reflecting the federal autonomy of states.
States independently schedule elections for governors, state legislatures, and municipal bodies. This decentralized electoral model acknowledges the diversity and autonomy of subnational units and prioritizes continuous political accountability (Keyssar, 2000). India, in contrast, proposes a central-level enforced synchronization, which may be incompatible with its quasi-federal constitutional structure.
6.2 South Africa: Partial Synchronization in a Proportional System
South Africa holds simultaneous national and provincial elections, facilitated by its proportional representation system, where the executive is not directly elected, and terms are fixed. The synchronization here is enabled by a unitary executive structure and nationally determined electoral timelines (Booysen, 2006).
Unlike India’s multi-tiered, first-past-the-post (FPTP) parliamentary system, South Africa’s model reduces inter-governmental conflict during election cycles. However, analysts caution that proportional systems are more amenable to synchronization than FPTP multi-party systems like India, where staggered elections ensure checks and balances (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018).
6.3 Sweden and Belgium: Fixed-Term Synchronization with Stability Mechanisms
Countries like Sweden and Belgium conduct simultaneous elections for national and subnational legislatures, enabled by fixed terms and coalition politics. These nations have embedded mechanisms to ensure political stability, such as constructive vote of no-confidence, which prevents mid-term government collapses (Lijphart, 1999). Such features are largely absent in India’s political architecture.
In India, mid-term dissolutions and floor-crossing have historically disrupted state assemblies and parliamentary terms. Without mechanisms like fixed-term parliaments or constructive confidence, simultaneous elections could lead to a democratic and logistical deadlock when early dissolution becomes necessary.
6.4 Lessons for India: Contextual Constraints
– Electoral Uniformity vs. Federal Diversity: Many countries with successful synchronization follow unitary or semi-federal systems. India’s linguistic, cultural, and political diversity necessitates electoral flexibility.
– Fixed Terms and Political Stability: Nations with synchronized elections often employ fixed-term parliaments or legal safeguards against premature dissolution. India’s current system allows fluidity in government tenure, which clashes with fixed synchrony.
– Voter Behavior and Electoral Integrity: Studies from countries like Brazil and Argentina suggest that simultaneous elections can lead to voter confusion or the coattail effect, where local candidates benefit from national leaders’ popularity-mirroring Indian concerns (Hicken & Stoll, 2013).
Thus, international comparisons reveal that simultaneous elections function effectively only under specific institutional safeguards, many of which are lacking or underdeveloped in the Indian context.
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Simultaneous Elections
7. Policy Recommendations
The implementation of the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) proposal, while ambitious, requires a thoughtful blend of constitutional prudence, administrative foresight, and democratic sensitivity. Based on the historical precedents, comparative experiences, and critical challenges outlined in the preceding sections, the following policy recommendations are proposed:
1. Constitutional Amendments with Federal Consensus
The most fundamental requirement for ONOE is a series of constitutional amendments, particularly to Articles 83(2), 85, 172, 174, and 356, which govern the tenure and dissolution of Parliament and State Assemblies. Such amendments must be undertaken only through a consultative process involving both Union and State governments, respecting the “basic structure doctrine” of federalism upheld by the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). According to Bhambhri (2019), any move to enforce uniform electoral cycles without state concurrence would not only violate federal principles but could also trigger a constitutional crisis.
2. Fixed Terms and Constructive Vote of No Confidence
India could consider adapting the constructive vote of no confidence, as followed in Germany and Sweden, where a government can only be dismissed if an alternative majority is proposed. This mechanism would ensure political continuity and avoid mid-term dissolutions, a critical prerequisite for synchronized elections. Ghai (2021) argues that fixed terms would reduce the frequency of elections and provide governments with stable tenures to implement long-term policies without populist pressures.
3. Phased Synchronization as a Transitional Strategy
Instead of enforcing complete synchronization at once, a phased approach could be adopted. For instance, group states whose assembly elections are due within six months of Lok Sabha elections and gradually align others over a ten-year horizon. This would allow adequate legal and logistical preparation. As suggested by the NITI Aayog (2018), “grouping elections into two phases over a decade-long transitional framework could make the process manageable and legally viable.”
4. Creation of a Permanent Election Commission Secretariat
To operationalize simultaneous elections, the Election Commission of India (ECI) must be strengthened through a permanent, constitutionally empowered secretariat, equipped with autonomy in recruitment, budget, and operations, similar to the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) or Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). According to the Law Commission (2015), institutional strengthening of the ECI is essential to manage the scale, personnel, and infrastructure demands of ONOE.
5. Electoral Literacy and Ballot Design Innovations
Synchronized elections may lead to ballot fatigue and voter confusion. Therefore, extensive voter awareness campaigns and simplified ballot designs (e.g., color-coded EVMs or VVPAT slips for different elections) should be adopted to ensure informed and rational voting behavior. A study by Kumar and Tripathi (2020) found that longer and more complex ballots in municipal and panchayat elections often reduce voter accuracy, especially in rural and low-literacy constituencies.
6. Fiscal Prudence through Election Fund Consolidation
Establishing an Electoral Consolidated Fund, jointly financed by the Union and States, can ensure the financial viability of simultaneous elections while enhancing transparency in campaign spending. Reports by the Centre for Media Studies (2022) estimate that general election expenditures crossed -60,000 crore in 2019, underscoring the potential savings of ONOE.
7. Safeguarding Regional Autonomy and Asymmetric Federalism
It is imperative to preserve the autonomy of states, especially those with distinct political histories or those governed under special provisions (e.g., Sixth Schedule areas or Article 371). Any synchronization plan must be sensitive to regional diversities and allow for opt-in/opt-out mechanisms. As Palshikar (2020) cautions, imposing central timelines on diverse state contexts risks diluting the spirit of cooperative federalism and alienating regional political voices.
8. Conclusion
The concept of One Nation, One Election (ONOE) is emblematic of an ambitious vision to streamline India’s democratic processes and reduce the economic, administrative, and political disruptions associated with frequent elections. Proponents argue that synchronized elections can lead to enhanced governance efficiency, cost savings, and reduced policy paralysis. However, a critical examination reveals that the implementation of ONOE is fraught with constitutional, logistical, and political complexities that demand thorough scrutiny and inclusive dialogue.
India’s electoral and federal architecture was deliberately designed to accommodate diversity-of governance timelines, political aspirations, and regional autonomy. A uniform electoral cycle, while appealing on the surface, poses serious risks to the federal equilibrium enshrined in the Constitution. Past experiences and comparative analyses demonstrate that democratic synchronization must not override democratic pluralism. The cases of Germany, South Africa, and Sweden show that electoral stability can be achieved through institutional innovations like fixed-term parliaments, constructive no-confidence motions, and gradual synchronization-all anchored in consensus-building.
This paper has argued that a phased, federalist, and participatory approach is essential if ONOE is to be realized without undermining the autonomy of states or compromising the legitimacy of electoral processes. The proposed recommendations-ranging from constitutional amendments and electoral reforms to voter literacy and fiscal mechanisms-aim to strike a balance between administrative efficiency and democratic inclusivity.
Ultimately, synchronizing democracy should not be reduced to a procedural exercise but should be viewed through the lens of democratic deepening. Any move in this direction must be guided by the principles of cooperative federalism, constitutional morality, and citizens’ trust. Only through deliberation, consensus, and gradual reform can India pursue the vision of ONOE without weakening its democratic foundations.
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